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Abstract: 
This paper critically examines the constraints of the current global governance of 
HIV/AIDS to reach the target set by governments and the leading development institutions 
to halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015 as part of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The HIV/AIDS crisis can only be resolved effectively when 
its nexus with poverty and neo-liberal globalization is acknowledged and addressed by 
comprehensive and long-term policy responses. Three dimensions of the current global 
governance of HIV/AIDS are identified as strategically relevant for a reform agenda: first, 
the democratic deficit of decision making processes and institutions; second, the limited 
access of sufficient and reliable sources of financial resources and the burden of foreign 
debt in developing countries; thirdly, the intellectual property rights regime and its effects 
on the access of anti-retroviral drugs for AIDS treatment.  
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE HIV/AIDS RESPONSE:  
LIMTATIONS OF CURRENT APPROACHES AND POLICIES 
 
The aim of this paper is to facilitate a policy reflection on the limitations and 
opportunities of current approaches to the global governance of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic with the objective of contributing to the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of halting and beginning to reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS by 2015. 
 
The paper begins with a brief discussion on the relation between the process of 
neo-liberal globalization, poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is claimed that the 
threat posed by the spread of HIV/AIDS constitutes a serious development 
challenge associated with the uneven distributional impact of the globalization 
process on the world’s most poor countries and regions. The prospects of 
eradicating this disease can only be realized if HIV/AIDS is recognized as a 
development problem and addressed through the adoption of comprehensive and 
long-term policy responses.  
 
Some of the central dimensions of the current global governance of HIV/AIDS are 
identified in order to locate key strategic areas for policy reform. Firstly, the 
dimension of political power is discussed in relation to the ownership and 
legitimacy of existing policy responses and arrangements to combat HIV/AIDS 
globally. The issue of democratic control and representation of policy initiatives is 
of central importance to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability.  
 
Secondly, the availability of sufficient and reliable sources of funding is another 
important dimension of the global governance of HIV/AIDS. In spite of the 
considerable resources generated and committed by donor countries and 
institutions to support HIV/AIDS programs, the virus continues to spread posing a 
major development crisis. Among the various reasons that explain this, the 
problem of the foreign debt in developing countries is discussed as a key factor 
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limiting the prospects of reaching the Millennium Development Goal.  
 
Thirdly, the current international Intellectual Property Right (IPR) regimes are also 
a central part of the global governance of HIV/AIDS. They regulate the cost of anti-
retroviral (ARV) drugs for AIDS treatment, conditioning the degree of access to 
these medicines by poor countries.  
 
Finally, the last section advances a series of policy recommendations and areas for 
a reform agenda.  
 
 
Globalization, poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
 
The period of rapid economic globalization experienced over the past two decades 
following the neo-liberal doctrine has corresponded with the global spread of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. There is no coincidence in this. Globalization has created 
opportunities for economic growth and development, but there is no doubt that the 
spread of its benefits and negative impacts have been rather uneven between and 
across countries. Global inequality is not only restricted to differences in per capita 
income. It also concerns widening gaps in key development indicators, such as life 
expectancy, infant mortality, public health, education, among others. The 
developing countries have been overall the most affected by the social and 
economic impacts of globalization.  
 
Poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS are complementary and self-reinforcing. The 
weaker the social and economic conditions in a given country or area, the more 
vulnerable its population becomes to the risk of contracting the HIV virus and of 
being severely affected by AIDS. A good infrastructure of public education and 
health are absolutely necessary to prevent the spread of this virus, and to treat 
those that have been infected by it. In turn, the more affected a population 
becomes to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the less likely it stands a chance at economic, 
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social and institutional development. Poverty and HIV/AIDS produce a downward 
spiral from which it is not easy to escape.  
 
An understanding of the globalization-poverty nexus is crucial to address the 
HIV/AIDS crisis. The global governance of HIV/AIDS must avoid policies that 
exacerbate social tensions; promote strong social institutions and social partners; 
promote social cohesion based on investments in health and education; and 
support sound labor relations based on core labor standards (ILO, 2005). There 
can only be chance to stop the HIV/AIDS if it is addressed as development 
challenge.  
 
The globalization process and poverty is also associated with the increased 
movement of people across borders. The pressure of flows of labor migration from 
poor to rich countries in search of better economic opportunities has increased as 
a result of the widening of global inequality. This has facilitated the spread of 
HIV/AIDS worldwide. It is for this reason that only global approaches and 
responses to the HIV/AIDS problem can ultimately be effective for the eradication 
of this disease. 
 
 
Democratic deficit and the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS responses 
 
The global governance of HIV/AIDS refers to the multiple and interlaced 
arrangements of institutionally formal and informal norms/rules which define and 
condition the nature of global responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The content 
and control of such norms is subject to a process of permanent contestation and 
negotiation that takes place (formally and informally) among multilateral institutions 
part of the United Nations, public-private institutions such as the Global Fund to 
Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, corporations, civil society organizations and policy 
networks. The extent to which HIV/AIDS responses are effective and sustainable in 
time depends on their degree of legitimacy and ownership in the eyes of those 
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involved in the formulation and delivery of those policies. The issue of the 
democratic control of this complex arrangement of power relations becomes 
particularly important.   
 
The unequal representation of the interests of developing countries in international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and the limited transparency and accountability of their 
policy processes are central concerns in current policy debates on the reform of 
these institutions in light of pressing demands to increase their democratic 
legitimacy. The possibility of poor countries to influence the definition of agendas, 
rules and procedures of IFIs related to the formulation of HIV/AIDS global 
responses is very limited. Differing degrees of formal and informal representation 
reflect underlying structural economic inequalities between countries in the current 
global political economy. In the case of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, the voting power of member countries is proportional to the 
amount of financial contribution brought in by each of its members. Industrialized 
countries are in a position to give proportionally greater quotas than developing 
countries, thus dominating the executive board of the institutions both in terms of 
chairs and votes. This has permitted industrialized countries to withstand recent 
initiatives put forward by governments of emerging middle-income countries to 
reform the current system of representation of these institutions.  
 
A recent IMF proposal was presented at the last IMF and World Bank meeting in 
18 September 2006 to increase the voting rights of some countries (China, South 
Korea, Turkey and Mexico) and to revamp the way voting quotas are calculated. 
The proposal was finally approved, despite the opposition of the G24 countries and 
33 other countries which proposed an immediate general revision of the quota 
system. Although this reform is a step in the right direction, it did not alter the 
imbalance of power in the IMF or give a greater representation of other developing 
countries. Industrialized countries continue to maintain control over the decisions of 
the institution. Until deep reforms to democratize the IMF are introduced, the 
increasingly challenged democratic legitimacy of this institution will continue to 
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undermine the efforts to create a more democratic multilateral system. 
  
The problem of unequal representation of developing countries in the IFIs is not 
restricted to the nature of formal institutions per se. This can be seen clearly in the 
case of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In spite of the fact that all member 
states have an equal vote within the WTO decision making structure, poor 
countries are less well represented that its rich counterparts.  On the one hand, the 
wide range of issues and increasing technical complexity that are negotiated in the 
WTO poses a great challenge for poor countries with deficient bureaucratic 
capacity and resources. Nearly a third of the member states do not even have a 
permanent representation at the organization’s headquarters in Geneva. With 
small and weak bureaucracies, many poor countries are not adequately 
represented in the international forums that determine rules for the global economy 
that will affect their future prospects of development, and HIV/AIDS responses 
more specifically. On the other hand, the dependence of developing countries from 
international capital and investment, technology, aid, market access to 
industrialized countries and the burden of foreign debt conspire against their 
capacity to influence the negotiation process of trade rules. The underlying 
inequalities in economic power of different countries translate in uneven bargaining 
power, compromising therein their policy autonomy and influence in the negotiation 
of global trade rules. Equality in formal representation does not resolve the 
problem of structural inequality of developing countries in the world economy.  
 
The democratic deficit of global governance institutions also relates to their limited 
degree of public accountability and transparency. There are rarely any independent 
assessment of the impacts of their policies and operations on countries and 
peoples. Likewise, there are no procedures in place by which people that have 
been adversely affected as consequence of the policies implemented by 
international institutions can take their complaints and seek compensation (ILO, 
2004: 78). With regards to transparency, there is often scarce information available 
for public scrutiny. Information is required in order to engage broad sectors of 
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society in a debate about the potential positive or negative impacts of policy 
decisions. In this respect, civil society organizations have played a valuable role in 
demanding greater transparency and accountability from global economic and 
financial institutions (O’Brien et al., 2000; Scholte and Schnabel, 2002).   
 
The difficulty of a lack of greater coherence and coordination of HIV/AIDS 
responses evidences the absence of a sense of collective ownership among 
governments (even among governments from industrialized Northern countries). 
Multilateral responses are severed by the adoption of donor countries of unilateral 
instruments. Most of the funding available for HIV/AIDS programs is provided 
through bilateral channels ($3.5 billion or 81%), while the remainder is allocated 
through contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(The Global Fund) ($813.6 million or 19%) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006). As in 
other areas of global governance, the United States has a leading role in the 
combat of HIV/AIDS when compared with other countries. The United States is the 
single largest donor of overseas development aid (ODA) for health, the main 
contributor to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, and since 2003 
it has largest single HIV/AIDS program with the establishment of the Presidential 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Half of the ODA available 
internationally to target HIV/AIDS specifically is provided by this country.  
 
Unilateral initiatives like PEPFAR have strict conditionalities that are imposed on 
the governments of aid recipient countries who are often not in a position to reject 
or influence the terms of such funding. Conditions attached to this kind of aid often 
require currency exchange and purchase of imported goods and services procured 
by the donor country at high costs (like expensive patented medicine, equipment 
and supplies) and promotion of abstinence-based prevention programs and 
hostility to condoms (Actionaid, 2006: 4; OXFAM, 2002: 16; UNAIDS, 2006a: 249). 
Similarly, the prevalence of bilateral channels over multilateral mechanisms 
discourages the prospects of reaching a broad consensus among the international 
community on a shared policy framework to fight HIV/AIDS. The problem of the 
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HIV/AIDS pandemic needs to be addressed as a global issue demanding joined 
global initiatives. No one donor or aid recipient can achieve this alone (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2006: 16).  
 
There have been some recent attempts to make HIV/AIDS responses more 
effective by introducing greater policy coherence and coordination. One example of 
this is the establishment of the UN system-Global Fund Global Joint Problem-
solving and implementation Support Team (GIST) in 2005. The GIST promotes 
problem-solving and concerted action among various multilateral partners to 
accelerate the implementation of AIDS programs and foster policy harmonization. 
However, it is important to notice that the existing lack of policy harmonization is 
not only a technocratic challenge that can be solved purely by creating innovative 
institutional mechanisms like GIST. Underlying this problem there is the tension 
between fundamentally different ways of understanding global public health and of 
organizing institutionally responses to global health challenges (Ingram, 2005: 
384). In particular, the global politics HIV/AIDS are driven by conflicting views and 
interests concerning the role of the state and international institutions and of the 
market in the provision of health services (Segall, 2003). What are the 
responsibilities of public institutions and the private sector (corporations and civil 
society organizations)? How to hold their actions accountable to citizen control?    
 
 
Money talks but does it also safe lives?  
The financial governance of HIV/AIDS responses 
 
In recent years there has been a considerable increase in the amount of financial 
resources committed by the international community to combat the HIV/AIDS. 
Estimates show that there has been a rise of committed resources (from 
international and domestic sources) from approximately $1.6 billion in 2001 to $ 6.1 
billion in 2004 and $8.3 billion in 2005 (UNAIDS, 2006a: 224-252). Despite this, 
however, the resulting amounts made available continue to be inadequate to 
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address the challenges posed by a HIV/AIDS pandemic of growing proportions 
(Mackellar, 2005: 308).  
 
The claim that there are insufficient financial resources to combat HIV/AIDS is not 
based on pessimistic assessments of future scenarios. The gap between financial 
resources and needs is already a serious concern today affecting ongoing 
initiatives to eradicate this disease. The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) estimates that in 2005, $11.6 billion was needed to effectively respond 
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in low- and middle-income countries, yielding a gap of 
$3.3 billion over what was available that year. Total funding needs are projected to 
rise to $14.9 billion in 2006 and reach $22.1 billion by 2008 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2006). Even the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
which was celebrated as an innovative and effective fund raising mechanism, 
regularly faces a funding shortfall (Actionaid, 2006; AIDSPAN, 2005; ICASO, 2004: 
7; OXFAM, 2002: 9; UNICEF, 2006). Since it is difficult to have accurate 
estimations of the increasing needs for additional funding in the future, it also 
possible that the problem of HIV/AIDS may be even worse than current estimates 
suggest (UNAIDS, 2005: 4). What is certain is that rate of spread of this disease is 
at the moment increasingly higher than the rate at which resources have been so 
far generated. The greater the number of people that is infected by HIV every year, 
the larger the need for additional funding will be required in the future. The problem 
of a growing gap between resources pledged and needed must be addressed 
immediately. This makes sense not only on ethical grounds, but also on financial 
ones.   
  
In order to combat HIV/AIDS not only it is necessary to generate sufficient 
resources to finance policy responses, but also to ensure that sources of funding 
are reliable and predictable. Currently, the short-term of funding cycles are defined 
by annual and biannual frames. This undermines the possibility of planning for the 
kind of long-term sustained initiatives that are required to be able to eradicate the 
HIV virus (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006: 16).  
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One of the reasons that current funding cycles are short-term has to do with the 
way in which HIV/AIDS has been understood and targeted by donor’s policy 
interventions. HIV/AIDS has been mostly addressed as an ‘emergency’ problem, 
often prompting focused policy interventions and relief efforts to remedy or contain 
its impact. This approach to HIV, and its associated policy responses, has not 
facilitated the formulation of a long-term perspective which can eliminate the 
causes of this disease (Secklinelgin, 2005: 365). The AIDS crisis cannot be 
addressed by snap policy decisions (Arndt and Lewis, 2000: 884). What is needed 
is a long-term vision that can orient a sustained collective commitment and 
mobilization of resources to eradicate this disease completely. Such a vision must 
enable us to go beyond the limited impacts of crisis management responses of 
HIV/AIDS.  
 
In addition to the availability of sufficient and stable financial resources for 
HIV/AIDS responses there is also the problem of foreign debt which affects the 
capacity of recipient countries to address the HIV crisis by allocating scarce 
resources to the improvement of public services and infrastructure. The nexus 
between poverty, debt and HIV becomes explicit when considering that currently 
about one in three of all HIV/AIDS sufferers – around 13 million people – live in 
countries classified by the IMF and World Bank as ‘Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries’ (HIPC). These countries also face some of the highest HIV prevalence 
rates in the world and are the most restricted in terms of their capacity to respond 
to this disease by improving their health and education systems.  
 
The proliferation of single-disease initiatives in global health reflects a move away 
from integrated and systemic approaches to health and health systems that is 
consistent with the redefinition of the role of the state under the neo-liberal 
paradigm. The lesser emphasis placed on integrated health systems contradicts 
the growing consensus among health specialists that the success of responses to 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic depends on quality of integrated health systems in 
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supporting interventions (Ingram, 2005: 384; Segall, 2003). According to estimates 
of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, low-income countries need to 
increase spending on health by an amount equivalent to around 1.6 per cent of 
GNP a year to 2015 (based on 2002 costs) to provide effective health coverage 
and so meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (OXFAM, 2002: 15). Low-
income countries are far from reaching the levels of investment that are needed.  
 
Debt servicing amounts a substantial percentage of resources that could be 
otherwise allocated to improving public service delivery. Half of the 26 HIPC 
countries in mid-2005 were still spending 15 per cent or more of government 
revenues on debt repayments; half of them were also spending more on debt than 
on public health. For example, Zambia spends 30 per cent more on debt than on 
health; Cameroon’s debt repayments amount to three-and-a-half times its spending 
on health; both Malawi and Mali spend less on health than on debt servicing 
(OXFAM, 2002). Repayments to both multilateral and bilateral creditors by these 
countries are diverting resources needed to fight HIV/AIDS and to break the links 
between ill-health and poverty. While the pandemic destroys lives and livelihoods, 
debt repayment is taking precedence over human needs. 
 
Existing debt relief programs under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HICP) 
Initiative are not adequate to address the development challenge posed by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. In order to qualify for HICP, indebted countries need to have 
demonstrated a track record of reform and sound policies in line with the IMF and 
World Bank structural adjustment and reform programs. The pressure to open up 
public services to the private sector under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) heavily constrains the ability of developing countries to construct 
health systems along the lines that supported health improvements in many rich 
countries (Ingram, 2005: 393-4). This poses a paradox since the ‘deeper and more 
intrusive the policies of structural adjustment, the weaker and more aid-reliant the 
state, resulting in a severely diminished capacity to resist the institutional reforms 
that condition access to development financing’ (Tan, 2007: 163).  
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Furthermore, the tight fiscal discipline demanded by IMF and World Bank programs 
sets limits to the possibility of developing countries to increase their levels of public 
spending in basic services and infrastructures required to respond effectively to the 
HIV/AIDS challenge.  
 
Also, the HICP does not address the real budget constraints of poor countries. The 
criterion employed to assess debt sustainability gives priority to external debt 
indicators such as debt service/export rations and debt/GDP ratios rather than 
internal indicators as the ratio of debt service/government revenues (OXFAM, 
2002: 13, 18-19). The implication of this is that obligations of countries to financing 
public investment for human development are considered to be less important than 
the advancement of trade liberalization reforms.   
 
 
Rules on Intellectual Property Rights and the access of medicine  
 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement that was 
signed in 1994 a global standard for the protection of intellectual property rights 
(patents, trademarks, copyright) for World Trade Organization (WTO) members. 
Under the TRIPS agreement, signatories are required to implement TRIPS 
provisions via national legislation, adopt enforcement measures and be subject to 
trade sanctions in the event of non-compliance with TRIPS provisions. The impact 
of the TRIPS on access to essential medicines, and particularly AIDS drugs, in 
developing countries has made it one of the most controversial WTO agreements.  
 
The establishment of TRIPS has been attributed to the pressure exerted by a 
reduced number of pharmaceutical corporations in their attempt to introduce legal 
framework to protect their investments and profits by creating a twenty-year 
monopoly right for their products. Their profits are safeguarded by preventing that 
their drugs are copied for the production of generic versions of the drugs at lower 
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costs to supply poor countries, but also by preventing that generic drugs may leak 
back into the more profitable consumer markets in the industrialized countries in 
which the margins for profit are substantially greater (Poku, 2002: 297). The 
monopoly right introduced by TRIPS artificially raises the prices of anti-retroviral 
(ARV) drugs. In creating a monopoly for the production ARV drugs, large 
pharmaceutical corporations have effectively amplified their private interests into 
public international law (Sell, 2000: 91). 
 
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted at the 
WTO’s Ministerial Conference in 2001 was a response to the concerns and 
controversy raised by this agreement. The Declaration reaffirmed and clarified the 
flexibilities available under TRIPS Agreement which can and should be interpreted 
in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and to 
promote access to medicines for all. Also, least developed countries were given an 
extension of the transitional period for compliance with the agreement regarding 
pharmaceutical patents from 2006 to 2016, while WTO developed countries 
Member States were mandated to provide incentives to their enterprises and 
institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least developed 
countries with little or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sectors.  
 
These flexibilities include the right of governments to issues compulsory licenses 
so that patented products can be manufactured without the consent of the patent 
owner. It also grants governments the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are given. In August 2003 WTO members further agreed to 
modify TRIPS provisions relating to compulsory licensing, permitting export of low-
cost generics to developing countries that do not have the capacity to produce 
these medicines domestically.  
 
The use governments of the flexibility provisions contemplated in the TRIPS 
agreement has a direct impact on the supply and demand of medicines with 
implications for their cost and accessibility. There is need to stimulate a global 
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market for generic ARVs, as it is evidence that the introduction of generic 
competition has lowered the price of patented drugs (Stop AIDS Campaign, 2006; 
UNDP, 2006). Generic drug competition has accounted for a drop in the annual 
cost of standard antiretroviral (ARV) medications from 10,000 dollars to about 140 
dollars per patient per year in countries like South Africa. The more governments 
use TRIPS flexibility provisions, the more solidly this normative standard will be 
embedded, advancing the view of health as a global public good. This is a 
particularly pressing issue at a time where there is a growing need for ‘second-line’ 
drug treatment needed for patients that have developed resistance to the their first 
combination of medicines.  
 
It is difficult for developing countries to exercise the full range of TRIPS flexibilities. 
Pharmaceutical companies in developed countries, supported by their 
governments, have tended to resist moves toward the abolition of patents on AIDS 
drugs, which could encourage the production of generics as well as drive down the 
prices of patent drugs. These companies have the advantage of access to private 
investment capital and control of the research and development (R&D) production 
of new pharmaceutical technology and the supply of their products in the global 
market. This advantage provides them with greater leverage in setting not only the 
terms of the intellectual property regime, but also conditions under which 
governments can make use of its provisions to respond to their obligations as 
providers of public health in cases of national emergency. Additionally, there are 
the pressures for liberalization, the realities of trade negotiations and litigation and 
the bureaucratic burden involved in the new rules (Ingram, 2005: 394).  
 
In the attempt to undermine the flexibilities guaranteed in the Doha Declaration the 
United States has been introducing a ‘TRIPS-plus’ agenda of intellectual property 
rights through the signing of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA). In the past 
five years, the United States has concluded negotiations of FTAs with Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, South Korea, 
Israel, Malaysia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the Central America-
 16
Dominican Republic (CAFTA) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
(UNDP, 2006). 
 
The TRIPS-plus agenda includes provisions to: expand the scope of 
pharmaceutical patents to include new indications, new formulations, and other 
minor changes; limit grounds for issuing compulsory licenses to emergencies, 
government non-commercial use, and competition cases only; bar parallel trade of 
on-patent drugs sold more cheaply elsewhere where prohibited by contract; and 
extend patent monopolies for administrative delays by patent offices and drug 
regulatory authorities. Under a ‘data exclusivity’ clause, the US demands that 
companies or government agencies desiring to register a generic drug cannot 
make use of the original company’s clinical trial and safety data already screened 
by the health authorities, even if it can be shown that the generic and original drugs 
are identical in composition. As a result of this, generic drugs will not get safety 
approval and thus cannot be marketed to patients, even if the government has 
issued a compulsory license, and even if the drugs are not under paten in the 
country. While the WTO allows countries to import or produce generic drugs – 
through a government-issued compulsory license or government use order – the 
FTAs with the US shuts out or restricts such measures through many provisions, 
such as restricting the use of compulsory licenses.  
 
 
Areas of policy reform  
 
The targets set at the MDGs to halt and begin reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 
2015 will not be met without a bold reform of the current governance 
arrangements. The different sections of this paper identified key areas that demand 
special attention considering their constraining effects on the ongoing efforts to 
eradicate this pandemic. A series of tentative recommendations are advanced to 
facilitate the much needed debate on this pressing issue. 
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With respect to the democratic deficit of the global governance of HIV/AIDS, 
governments should move towards the democratization of multilateral decision-
making processes and institutions to ensure a more balanced representation of 
developing countries. Public-private initiatives like the Global Fund should also 
augment the representation of NGOs and vulnerable populations.  
 
Moreover, new formal mechanisms should be established to increase the 
transparency and accountability of multilateral processes and institutions. 
Governments should also foster a debate on the viability of a global freedom of 
information act.  
 
To ensure that the financial resources allocated to the eradication of HIV/AIDS are 
sufficient and reliable to support long-term policy initiatives governments should 
seek to adopt permanent multilateral mechanisms raise financial resources. Even 
the celebrated Global Fund has not escaped the uncertainties that result from 
governments withdrawing their resources. Predictability is central to be able to 
formulate responses from a long-term perspective.  
 
One way to generate the much needed additional resources to stop the spreading 
of HIV/AIDS is for governments to honor their pledge to commit 0.7 % of their 
national budget to development. Alternative sources of funding can also created 
with the incorporation of a system of taxation of global financial transactions (the 
Tobin tax). Such additional resources could be used to create special international 
funds to help the poorest countries build solid public health infrastructures and 
carry out effective programs to combat HIV/AIDS.  
 
The problem of debt continues to be a major stumbling block in the efforts to fight 
this pandemic. No matter how much resources are raised, unless a solution to the 
debt burden is put forwards there is little chance that current programs can stop the 
spread of the virus. The existing loan conditionalities of the IMF and HIPCs must 
be changed in ways that they allow fiscal space to indebted countries to raise 
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public spending in health services rather than acting as incentives for the 
privatization of public services.  
 
The more recent Enhanced HIPC Initiative could be reformed by including a debt 
servicing ceiling of five per cent of government revenue and less for countries that 
will otherwise be unable to reach the MDGs. This would relax the tight fiscal 
conditions that indebted countries have to meet and maintain to be eligible for 
HICP debt relief programs.  
 
Moreover, strategies to fight HIV/AIDS should be included as a central objective of 
national poverty reduction plans through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP). These should detail the full costing of plans, realistic financing schemes, 
and the development of transparent and accountable public financing systems to 
ensure that commitments are reflected in national budgets and medium-term 
expenditure frameworks. The PRSP can then also be used by the donor 
community as a framework for technical and financial support. 
 
The shared responsibility of industrialized countries in the governance of HIV/AIDS 
should also reflect a commitment to a serious revision of recent initiatives 
undertaken to cancel the debt of poor countries. The consequences of such 
initiatives should be measured in relation to the capacity of poor countries to 
improve their chances to eradicate the HIV virus by channeling additional funding 
to improve their public services, infrastructure and programs. Likewise, this kind of 
debate should also take place with respect the debt of poor countries affected by 
HIV/AIDS with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other regional 
banks.  
 
The possibility of allowing indebted countries to swap their debt obligations with 
increases in the levels of public investment in health and education services should 
also be contemplated as a viable and complementary option to debt cancellation.   
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Finally, to increase the supply and access of anti-retroviral (AVR) drugs to treat 
AIDS patients at affordable prices the manufacturing capacity of generic drug 
companies should be supported with the introduction of incentives and facilitation 
measures. Governments of countries heavily affected by AIDS should employ the 
existing flexibility measures TRIPS offered under the TRIPS agreement. In turn, 
governments from industrialized countries where the main pharmaceutical 
corporations are based should cease pressuring resource-limited countries that 
seeks to utilize the flexibility measures of TRIPS.  
 
Governments should also promote the removal of ‘health’ from the list of services 
subject to trade liberalization discussions. Only this way can health be treated as a 
public good and a social right, in line with the principles established at the 2001 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. A moratorium on the inclusion of 
‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions in regional and bilateral trade negotiations should also be 
adopted to prevent that the consensus reached in the Doha Declaration can be 
undermined with the establishment of other trade agreements.  
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